State of Utah v. David Roger Markland : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
State of Utah v. David Roger Markland : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey S. Gray; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Michaela
Andruzzi; Salt Lake District Attorney\'s Office; Attorneys for Appellee.
Linda M. Jones; Nisa J. Sisneros; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. David Roger Markland, No. 20020965 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4059
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID ROGER MARKLAND, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020965-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT PRESIDING 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
LINDA M. JONES MICHAELA ANDRUZZI 
NISA J. SISNEROS Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID ROGER MARKLAND, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020965-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT PRESIDING 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
LINDA M. JONES MICHAELA ANDRUZZI 
NISA J. SISNEROS Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Summary of Proceedings 2 
Summary of Facts 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
A. UNDER THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE, DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM 
ASSERTING ON APPEAL THAT HE WAS SEIZED BEFORE DEPUTY 
SPOTTEN RETAINED HIS IDENTIFICATION TO RUN A WARRANTS CHECK 5 
B. DEPUTY SPOTTEN'S INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF DEFENDANT WAS 
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION 7 
CONCLUSION 12 
ADDENDUM 
Addendum A ("Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law") 
Addendum B (suppression hearing transcript) 
Addendum C (preliminary hearing transcript) 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000) 11 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) 7, 8, 9, 12 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002) 10, 11 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981) 11 
United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 11 
United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2001) 9 
STATE CASES 
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, 998 P.2d 274 5 
State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, 47 P.3d 932 9, 12 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) 5 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 6, 7 
State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, 988 P.2d 7 8 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) 10 
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 999 P.2d 7 8 
State v. A/e«A:<?, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1990) 9 
State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App. 1996) 1 
State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah App. 1991) 6 
State v. Samora, 2002 UT App 384, 59 P.3d 604 6 
State v. TrujiUo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) 10 
ii 
FEDERAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 2, 7 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2002) 1 
in 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID ROGER MARKLAND, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020965-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an interlocutory order denying his motion to suppress. This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
seized following an investigatory detention? 
Standard of Review. "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion 
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 
P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-40 (Utah 1994)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, 
and possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor. R. 3-4. Defendant was thereafter 
adjudged incompetent to proceed to trial and was transferred to the Utah State Hospital for 
treatment. R. 32-34. After treatment, a preliminary hearing was held and defendant was 
bound over for trial on both charges. R. 42-52, 58-59. Defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence seized from his person and bag, arguing that his detention was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion. R. 53-70. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the 
motion to suppress. R. 78-81 (Addendum A); R. 110-11. This Court granted defendant's 
petition for interlocutory appeal. 
Summary of Facts1 
Shortly after 3:00 a.m. on April 30, 2001, the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office 
received a report that a woman was screaming and crying out for help in an area just east of 
1
 The facts are taken from the suppression hearing (Addendum B) and the preliminary 
hearing (Addendum C), upon which the trial court also relied. See R. 1-2, 10. 
2 
the Bridgeside Landing Apartments (4500 South, 500 West). R. 111: 3-4,7,10. Deputy Ed 
Spotten and his partner were dispatched to the location and arrived within five minutes. R. 
51; R. I l l : 3-6. To reach the location of the reported disturbance, Deputy Spotten turned 
onto a dead end road that ran behind the apartments. The road, which was not lit, accessed a 
basketball court on the side of the road and ended at a locked gate to a bike path next to the 
Jordan River. R. 111:3-5,8. 
When Deputy Spotten turned onto the road, he saw defendant carrying two "over-the-
shoulder" bags and walking down the road toward the locked gate. R. 111: 6, 8. After 
pulling up next to defendant, the deputies exited their patrol car and initiated contact with 
defendant. R. 51; R. 111: 7. Deputy Spotten told defendant they had received a report that 
someone was screaming for help and asked him if he had heard anything. R. I l l : 7. 
Defendant replied that he had not. R. 111: 7. Deputy Spotten also asked defendant where he 
was going. R. I l l : 10-11. Although defendant told the officers he was going home, which 
was located at approximately 4500 South 1300 East, there was no ready way for him to get 
there the way he was going. R. I l l : 10-11. Defendant would have had to climb over a six-
foot fence to access the bike path. R. I l l : 12. 
Deputy Spotten then asked defendant for his name and some identification so he could 
run some "checks" on him. R. 49; R. I l l : 9, 12. Deputy Spotten retained the identification 
and radioed dispatch requesting a criminal history and warrants check. R. 49-50; R. 111:9. 
In less than five minutes, dispatch notified Deputy Spotten that there was a $5,000 warrant 
for defendant's arrest. R. 111:9-10. Deputy Spotten arrested defendant on the warrant, and 
3 
incident to that arrest, searched defendant's person and the two bags he was carrying. R. 
I l l : 10. Deputy Spotten found methamphetamine in the pocket of defendant's jacket and 
crushed marijuana in one of the bags. R. 46-47; R. I l l : 10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the court below, defendant argued only that he was seized when Deputy Spotten 
retained his identification to run a warrants check. Therefore, under the invited error 
doctrine, he is barred from asserting on appeal that Deputy Spotten seized him prior to 
retaining his identification. 
A review of the record reveals that the facts known to Deputy Spotten at the time of 
the detention reasonably suggested that defendant may be involved in criminal activity 
justifying an investigatory stop. Deputy Spotten responded within five minutes to a report of 
a woman crying for help and found defendant in the immediate vicinity. No one else was 
present. Defendant told the deputy that he was going home, but the route he was traveling 
was blocked off and home was nearly twenty blocks away. Given the lateness of the hour 
and defendant's possession of two "over-the-shoulder" bags, Deputy Spotten had reasonable 
suspicion that defendant might be involved in criminal activity tied to the cry for help. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the investigatory stop was justified. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Our courts have recognized three levels of police encounters with the public that are 
constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a 
person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop;" [and] (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d616,617-18 (Utah 1987) {per curiam) (citations omitted); accord 
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f 10, 998 P.2d 274. 
On appeal, defendant argues that his encounter with the deputies constituted a level 
two detention at its inception and that such a detention was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion. See Aplt. Brf. at 7-23. Alternatively, he argues that, in the event the Court finds 
that he was detained only after he surrendered his identification to Deputy Spotten, 
reasonable suspicion was still not present to justify the warrants check. See Aplt. Brf. at 17-
20, 24-30. For the reasons explained below, defendant's claim fails. 
A. UNDER THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE, DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM 
ASSERTING ON APPEAL THAT HE WAS SEIZED BEFORE DEPUTY SPOTTEN 
RETAINED HIS IDENTIFICATION TO RUN A WARRANTS CHECK 
Defendant claims that he was seized from the outset of his encounter with the two 
deputies. See Aplt. Brf. at 7-23. Under the invited error doctrine, however, he is barred 
from making that claim on appeal. 
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The law is well settled that "on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993); accord State v. Perdue,813 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah 
App. 1991). "Otherwise, a criminal defendant could invite prejudicial error and ' implant it 
in the record as a form of appellate insurance '" State v. Samora, 2002 UT App 384, f 
29, 59 P.3d 604 (quoting State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989)). 
In his memorandum supporting the motion to suppress, defendant asserted that his 
encounter with the deputies "escalated to a level two encounter" when Deputy Spotten 
retained defendant's identification to run a warrants check. R. 68. The State conceded that 
point. R. 72. The only dispute below was whether that detention was supported by 
reasonable suspicion. See R. 68-69, 72-74. The nature of the dispute did not change at the 
suppression hearing. At that hearing, defendant expressly conceded that no detention 
occurred until Deputy Spotten retained defendant's identification to run a warrants check. In 
his argument, defense counsel stated: 
There's three levels in a stop. The first level you can stop and question the 
individual. The initial questioning is fine. He's asking him what he's doing 
there. Once he takes his identification, he }s now detained him and that has 
risen to a level two stop. There's no question about that. I don't think the 
State can— 
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R. I l l : 13-14 (emphasis added). At that point, the trial court interrupted, indicating that 
"the Stated conceded that," and defense counsel thereafter argued that the officer did not 
have reasonable suspicion to detain him at that point. R. I l l : 14-15. 
Having led the trial court into the now alleged error, defendant is barred from 
asserting it on appeal. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220.3 The only issue on appeal, therefore, is 
whether, at the time he took defendant's identification, Deputy Spotten had reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant to investigate any possible involvement with the reported cry 
for help. 
B. DEPUTY SPOTTEN'S INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF DEFENDANT WAS 
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 
1868, 1879 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the Fourth Amendment has been 
interpreted to mean that "police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial 
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure . . . ." (emphasis added). 
2
 Although defense counsel referred to three levels in a "stop," he was clearly 
referring to the three different levels of citizen-police encounters. 
3
 The trial court concluded that "[t]he State concedes that the stop was a level-two 
stop requiring reasonable articulable suspicion." R. 79 at f^ 1. Defendant argues that the 
court's conclusion "seems to suggest that from the beginning, the stop was a level-two 
detention." Aplt. Brf. at 8. That argument is frivolous. In the first place, defendant never 
argued that the encounter became a level two detention at any point prior to retention of his 
identification. In the second place, the State conceded only that the stop was a level two 
detention at the point the deputy retained defendant's identification. 
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However, as in Terry, "we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily 
swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which 
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant 
procedure." Id. As such, Deputy Spotten's conduct "must be tested by the Fourth 
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. 
Terry held that in order to assess the reasonableness of a stop, courts must "'balancfe] 
the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails/" Id. 
at 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1879 (citations omitted). Acknowledging the government's legitimate 
interest in effective crime prevention and detection, Terry held that "a police officer may in 
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of 
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an 
arrest." Id. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (emphasis added). The Terry stop, as it has come to be 
known, is justified under those circumstances where "there is a reasonable suspicion that a 
person is involved in criminal activity." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^  11, 999 P.2d 7. 
This Court has explained that "[t]he reasonable suspicion necessary for an 
investigative stop . . . must be judged against an objective standard—that is, whether there 
were specific and articulable facts known to the officer, which taken together with rational 
inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify 
intrusion into the defendant's personal security." State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, % 12, 
988 P.2d 7; accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 -22,88 S.Ct. at 1880. "In considering the totality of 
the circumstances, [this Court] "'judge[s] the officer's conduct in light of common sense and 
8 
ordinary human experience . . . and [it] accord[s] deference to an officer's ability to 
distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.'" State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, 
U 8,47 P.3d 932 (quoting United States v. Williams,21\ F.3d 1262, 1268 (lOthCir. 2001)). 
Applying the reasonable suspicion standard here, the objective facts known to Deputy 
Spotten at the time of the detention reasonably suggested "that criminal activity may be 
afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. Deputy Spotten responded to a report that a 
woman was screaming or crying out for help in the vicinity of a dead end readjust east of 
the Bridgeside Landing Apartments. R. I l l : 3-4, 7, 10. Upon his arrival on the scene, 
Deputy Spotten observed defendant walking down the dead end road in the same vicinity 
where the woman was reported screaming out for help. R. 111:6, 8. No one else was 
present. R. 111:6. Moreover, defendant was walking towards an area that he could not 
pass. R. 111: 6, 8, 10-12. When Deputy Spotten asked defendant where he was going, 
defendant told him he was walking home. R. I l l : 10-11. Yet, there was no apparent way 
for defendant to travel home using that route. R. 111:10-12. At best, defendant would have 
been required to scale a locked and gated fence. R. I l l : 12. 
Although defendant's activities could be explained as innocent, "'officers need not 
close their eyes to suspicious circumstances.'" Beach, 2002 UT App 160, at ^ f 11 (quoting 
Williams, 271 F.3d at 1270). For example, "common sense and ordinary human experience" 
suggests that people are not usually found walking down isolated roads at three o'clock in 
the morning. Common sense and ordinary human experience suggests that people do not 
generally attempt to travel home by foot at 3:00 a.m. when home is nearly twenty blocks 
9 
away. Defendant's intended route also required him to scale a six-foot fence, passage 
through which was restricted by a locked gate. Doing so would have constituted criminal 
trespass. See 76-6-206(2)(b)(ii) (1999). Added to these unusual circumstances, police 
received a fresh report that a woman was heard crying for help in the immediate vicinity. R. 
I l l : 3-4, 7, 10. This case, therefore, is distinguishable from both State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 
85, 89 (Utah App. 1987), and State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah 1991), upon which 
defendant relies, Aplt. Brf. at 15-20, where there were no recent reports of possible criminal 
activity. 
While a cry for help may have been precipitated by an injury due to some innocent 
cause, a reasonable person might also infer that it was precipitated by an assault, rape, or 
robbery. Ordinary human experience suggests that the likelihood of a criminal cause was 
greater given the lateness of the hour. And in light of the possibility that a robbery or 
burglary might have precipitated the cry for help, defendant's possession of two "over-the-
shoulder" bags, rather than one, added to the odds that defendant was involved in criminal 
activity. While carrying one "over-the-shoulder" bag may appear wholly innocent, even at 
3:00 a.m., carrying a second reasonably raises the level of suspicion under these 
circumstances. "Although each of the series of acts was 'perhaps innocent in itself,' . . . 
taken together, they 'warranted further investigation.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 
266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 751 (2002). 
In challenging the trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion justified the 
stop, defendant argues that the cry for help was not necessarily the result of criminal activity, 
10 
but "could have been anything, including a cat, or someone crying in her sleep or because 
she fell and injured herself." Aplt. Brf. at 14. However, as observed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court just last year, "[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out 
the possibility of innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. at 753. As with 
probable cause, reasonable suspicion does not require that an officer know with all certainty 
that a crime has occurred. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 
695 (1981) (holding that "[t]he process does not deal with hard certainties, but with 
probabilities"). Rather, "a Terry stop requires only a 'minimal level of objective 
justification,' and an officer may initiate one based not on certainty, but on the need to 
"check out" a reasonable suspicion." United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S.Ct. 1758 (1980)) (other internal 
quotes and citations omitted). This standard "is a less demanding standard than [even] 
probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the 
evidence." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675-76 (2000); accord 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 751. The cry for help at three o'clock in the morning 
was more than sufficient to justify a suspicion of criminal activity. 
Defendant also argues that defendant may have had any number of innocent 
explanations for his presence at the time. He suggests that had the officer asked, he may 
have learned that defendant was lost, that he believed the gate was unlocked, or that he was 
taking some kind of shortcut. See Aplt. Brf. at 19. However, even had defendant provided 
an innocent explanation, Deputy Spotten "was not bound to accept [it] as truthful," 
11 
particularly in light of the circumstances. See Beach, 2002 UT App 160, at f 11. Indeed, 
requesting a warrants check and criminal history of defendant under these circumstances 
would have provided some information to assist the deputy in assessing the credibility of 
defendant's explanation. 
In summary, the facts and circumstances before Deputy Spotten " 'warranted] a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was necessary." Terry, 392 U.S. at 
21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the trial 
court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
Respectfully submitted April 28, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^/ 
Maikland Da\ brf 
04 28 2003 4 17 PM 
S.GRAY 
'Assistant Attorney Gener; 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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I hereby certify that on April 28,2003,1 served two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, David Roger Markland, by causing them to be 
delivered by first class mail to his/her counsel of record as follows: 
Linda M. Jones 
Nisa J. Sisneros 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
Addendum \ 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
MICHAELA D. ANDRUZZI, 7804'' 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID ROGER MARKLAND, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Case No. 011906683 
Hon. William W. Barrett 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before this Court for hearing in the above entitled 
matter on September 10, 2002. Defendant was represented by counsel, Nisa Sisneros, and the 
State was represented by counsel, Michaela D. Andruzzi. The Court having read memoranda 
submitted by counsel, and considered arguments of counsel, hereby enters its FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 30, 2001, at 3:14 am, Deputy Edward Spotten (Hereinafter Deputy Spotten) 
received a dispatch to that informed him that someone was crying out for help in the east part 
of the apartment complex on Bridgeside Landing which has its entrance on Sunstone Road at 
500 West. 
2. The road that runs through the eastern part of the apartment complex ends in a dead-end. 
3. At the dead-end there is a basketball court, a bike path that was gated and locked at the time, 
and the Jordan river. 
4. There was no lighting at that end of the road. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 011906683 
Page 2 
5. Deputy Spotten arrived at the apartment complex within 5 minutes. 
6. Upon arriving at the eastern part of the complex, Deputy Spotten saw the defendant, David 
Roger Markland, walking towards the dead-end of the road carrying two bags. 
7. Deputy Spotten did not see anyone else in the area. 
8. Deputy Spotten pulled up next to the defendant and asked him his name. 
9. Deputy Spotten told him that he received a report of screams for help in that area and asked 
the defendant if he had heard anything. 
10. The defendant responded that he had not heard anything. 
11. Deputy Spotten asked the defendant where he was going. 
12. The defendant responded that he was going home to 13th East and 45th South. 
13. There was no way for the defendant to get home walking in the direction he was headed 
when Deputy Spotten stopped him. 
14. Deputy Spotten then asked the defendant for identification and told him he was going to 
check for warrants. 
15. There was a warrant for the defendant and deputy Spotten arrested the defendant. 
16. The subsequent search incident to arrest yieled marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug 
paraphernalia. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The State concedes that the stop was a level-two stop requiring reasonable articulable 
suspicion. 
2. The Court finds that Deputy Spotten had a reasonable articulable based on the following five 
factors: 
a) The deputy received a report that someone was crying for help five minutes earlier in 
the area where he found the defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 011906683 
Page 3 
b) It was late at night and the area was not well lit. 
c) The defendant was headed down a dead-end road where he could not get anywhere. 
d) The defendant said he was going home to a location that he could not get to by 
traveling in the direction in which he was headed. 
e) The defendant was carrying two bags with him. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing facts and conclusions the Court enters the following order: 
Defendant Markland's motion to suppress is denied. 
DATED this day of October, 2002. 
Approved as/te form: 
turpi 
Sisneros 
BY T^E £©URT: 
Honorable William W. Barrett 
Third District Court Judge 
en 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 011906683 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law was delivered to Nisa Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant David Roger 
Markland, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the _2-_ day of 
September, 2002. 
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Addendum B 
A /-Jz-Jotirli i m r j 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH. 
DAVID ROGER MARKLAND, 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 10, 2002 
2 HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 MS. SISNEROS: Your Honor, we're ready on Markland. 
5 THE COURT: Markland? Okay. 
6 MS. SISNEROS: Let me grab my witness. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. This is State of Utah vs. David 
8 Markland, case number 011906683. Appearances please. 
9 MS. SISNEROS: Nisa Sisneros for Mr. Markland. 
10 MS. ANDRUZZI: Michaela Andruzzi on behalf of the 
11 State, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: One [inaudible] one witness, Ms. 
13 Andruzzi? 
14 MS. ANDRUZZI: I'm not sure we're even going to need 
15 him but he's here. 
16 THE COURT: Sorry? 
17 MS. ANDRUZZI: I'm not sure we'll need him, but he's 
18 here in case we do. It would just be one witness. 
19 THE COURT: Just one. Okay, do you want to call your 
20 first witness then? I'm going to invoke the exclusionary rule, 
21 so if there's anybody here who ought not to be here, send them 
22 out. 
23 MS. ANDRUZZI: There wouldn't be anybody else. Your 
24 Honor. Attached to Ms. Sisneros's motion, she's attached a 
25 preliminary hearing transcript. The State was planning on just 
1 
1 relying on that unless the Court wanted more information. 
2 THE COURT: Well, let me refresh my memory. Oh, 
3 yeah, okay, I'm with you here. Do you have your officer? 
4 Let's hear what he has to say. 
5 MS. ANDRUZZI: All right. The State would call 
6 Detective - or, sorry, Officer Spotten to the stand. 
7 EDWARD SPOTTEN 
8 having been first duly sworn, testified 
9 upon his oath as follows: 
10 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
11 BY MS. ANDRUZZI: 
12 Q Will you state your name and spell your last name for 
13 the record please? 
14 A Edward Spotten, last name spelling S-P-O-T-T-E-N. 
15 Q Thank you. And what is your occupation? 
16 A Deputy for Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. 
17 Q How long have you been a deputy for Salt Lake County? 
18 A Two years eight months. 
19 Q Is that the extent of your law enforcement 
20 experience? 
21 A No. 
22 Q What prior experience do you have? 
23 A I worked for Logan City PD as a reserve for about 
24 five months. 
25 Q Are you POST certified? 
2 
1 A I am. 
2 Q Were you employed by Salt Lake County on April 30 of 
3 the year 2001? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And what was your duty assignment on that date? 
6 A I was working the area of Taylorsville to patrol that 
7 beat. 
8 Q Great. Were you on duty at approximately 3:14 a.m.? 
9 A I was. 
10 Q Do you recall receiving a dispatch to a certain 
11 location on that date and at that time? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Okay. What was the nature of the call? 
14 A She called it in the east part of the complex of 
15 Ridgeside Landing that there was somebody screaming or crying 
16 out for help. 
17 Q Okay. And when you say the east side of the complex 
18 of Ridgeside Landing, is that in - is that an area that's know 
19 as Sunstone Road? 
20 A Sunstone Road actually is the entrance to the 
21 complex. 
22 Q All right. 
23 A The east side goes back into the complex a ways, and 
24 back past the buildings and back in there there's a little dead 
25 end area where there's some basketball courts and then if you 
3 
1 go over further there's actually the Jordan River. 
2 Q All right. Well, let's talk about that area. The 
3 area that you received the call that there had been some cries 
4 for help; is that correct? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q All right. And now, any area that these cries for 
7 help came from, were there residences? 
8 A The area would be east of the complex area. 
9 Q Okay. 
10 A There's actually - there's a row of complex buildings 
11 all together, and then there's a road that goes back in where 
12 they actually have a basketball court and -
13 Q And is that the area that you were going? 
14 A That's where they said that they heard the screams. 
15 It's actually in that area and right next to that area is also 
16 the Jordan River. It's just a dark wooded area back in there 
17 too. 
18 Q You've got the river, you've got basketball courts 
19 and a dead end road? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Is there any access to that dead end road other than 
22 the one entrance that you now proceeded to? 
23 A No. 
24 Q Okay. Were there any houses on that dead end road? 
25 A No. 
4 
1 Q Are there any apartments on that dead end road? 
2 A No. 
3 Q There's a basketball court, is there also a bike 
4 path? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Okay. Is there an entrance to that bike path? A 
7 gate? 
8 A I think it's locked. 
9 Q All right. 
10 A As I recall it was locked and somebody recently tore 
11 the gate off, but at that time it was locked. 
12 Q All right. And what about the basketball courts? 
13 Were they also - was there a gate to get into those? 
14 A There's no - there's no gate, it's just right on the 
15 side of the road. 
16 Q All right. So this is 3:14 a.m.? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q All right. How long did it take you to respond to 
19 that call? 
20 A I was there pretty quick. I was in the area as I 
21 recall. 
22 Q Give us an estimate when you say pretty quick do you 
23 mean one to two minutes? Two to three minutes? 
24 A Within five minutes. 
25 Q Within five minutes. 
5 
1 A I don't know the exact amount of time. I don't 
2 recall. 
3 Q All right. So you received a call that there were 
4 calls for help coming out from this dead end road at 3:14 a.m. 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q You responded to the area. What did you see when you 
7 got to the area? 
8 A I saw a male walking down that road. 
9 Q Okay. Was he walking away from the area in which 
10 you'd been told there were screams for help? 
11 A He was walking - trying to think which way he was 
12 walking - seems like he was walking toward the dead end part of 
13 the road. 
14 Q Did you see anybody else there? 
15 A There's nobody else there. 
16 Q Did you see the person that you saw walking on that 
17 day on the road-
18 A Yes. 
19 Q -in the courtroom? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Will you please point to him and tell the Court what 
22 he's wearing? 
23 A The blue suit next to the defense attorney. 
24 Q Did you subsequently obtain identification from him? 
25 A Yes. 
6 
1 Q And what was the name? 
2 A Roger Markland. 
3 MS. ANDRUZZI: May the record reflect identification 
4 of the defendant? 
5 THE COURT: It may. 
6 Q (BY MS. ANDRUZZI) When you initially saw the 
7 defendant walking on this dead end road, what did you do? Did 
8 you approach him? What happened? 
9 A Yes. I pulled up next to him and got out of my car 
10 and made contact with him. 
11 Q Okay. At the time that you pulled up next to him 
12 were you in a patrol vehicle? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Did you turn your lights on? Did you have your gun 
15 pulled? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Okay. So you just pulled up next to him and you 
18 started talking to him? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q What did you - what did you say to him? 
21 A I believe I asked him if he'd heard anything. I 
22 recounted to him that we'd had a call in the area there's a 
23 lady screaming for help, wanted to know if he heard anything. 
24 He replied he had not. 
25 Q He indicated that he had not heard anything? 
7 
1 A Right. 
2 Q All right. Did he have anything with him that seemed 
3 unusual? 
4 A He was carrying a couple of bags. 
5 Q What types of bags? 
6 A Well, they were just over-the-shoulder bags. 
7 Q Okay. So we're not talking grocery sacks? 
8 A No. 
9 Q All right. Like - like cloth bags? 
10 A Cloth bags, yes. 
11 Q He was carrying two bags? And it's 3:14 a.m.? 
12 A Right. 
13 Q Is the area well lit? 
14 A No, it's very dark. 
15 Q All right. Was there any activity going on back 
16 there that would account for his being present at that time? 
17 A Nothing. 
18 Q All right. Did you have anything else to explain the 
19 screams for help? 
20 A No. 
21 Q Okay. So you still hadn't found anything to explain 
22 that? 
23 A No. 
24 Q All right. After you asked him if he heard the 
25 screams for help, did you further detain him? 
1 A I asked him for some identification and I proceeded 
2 to identify who he was. 
3 Q And how'long did that take? 
4 A To identify who he was? 
5 Q Yes. 
6 A He provided me with an i.d. 
7 Q All right. 
8 A So just a matter of seconds. 
9 Q And what did you do with that i.d.? 
10 A I checked through dispatch and ran him and checked 
11 him for - to find out what kind of history he may have had, 
12 what kind of involvements, and to check him for warrants also. 
13 Q And how long did that take? 
14 A I believe I had a response back in less than five 
15 minutes. 
16 Q Okay. Did you indicate to him that that's what you 
17 were doing with his identification? 
18 A Yeah, I did. 
19 Q Okay. 
20 A I told him I needed to run some checks. 
21 Q And what did he indicate to you? 
22 A Nothing. 
23 Q All right. When you ran the checks, what did you 
24 find out about the defendant? 
25 A It came back that he had a $5,000 warrant as I 
9 
1 recall. 
2 Q Okay. And did you arrest him on that warrant? 
3 A I did. 
4 Q All right. Subsequent to that arrest, did you search 
5 the bags? 
6 A Yes, I did. 
7 Q And at that time did you find the drugs that he had 
8 in the bags? 
9 A I believe the drugs were found in his - part of the 
10 drugs were found in his jacket pocket actually, [inaudible] 
11 search. 
12 MS. ANDRUZZI: I don't have any further questions. 
13 THE COURT: I read the transcript that he said he was 
14 going home when you asked him what he was doing. Do you recall 
15 where he lived? 
16 THE WITNESS: He stated he lived, I believe it was 
17 over in the Murray area. Probably - I can't remember the exact 
18 address. I thought he said something like 1300 East or 
19 something like that. 
20 THE COURT: And he was at 4500 South and Ridgeside 
21 Way. Where's that? 
22 THE WITNESS: Fifth West. 
23 THE COURT: Fifth West? 
24 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
25 THE COURT: And he's walking home at 3:14 in the 
10 
1 morning? 
2 THE WITNESS: That's what he said. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any questions? 
4 MS. SISNEROS: Just some questions that will bring 
5 out some of the things that are in the transcript. Do you want 
6 me to question him on that or -
7 THE COURT: Well, I've just been kind of looking 
8 through the transcript, so. 
9 MS. SISNEROS: Okay. 
10 THE COURT: If you have some you want to ask go 
11 ahead. 
12 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
13 BY MS. SISNEROS: 
14 Q When you stopped Mr. Markland, you immediately tell 
15 him what - why it is that you're stopping him, right? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And then you asked him where he's going? Correct? 
18 And he told you he's going home. 
19 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
20 Q And he's in the general area where where his home is? 
21 A No. He's not. 
22 Q Well, is he heading towards the area where his home 
23 is? 
24 A I'm not sure - I'm not sure exactly how he's going to 
25 get there based on the dead end road. 
11 
1 Q Okay. Well, the Jordan - he's heading towards the 
2 Jordan River area? 
3 A That's His next stop. 
4 Q Is there a walkway along the Jordan area? 
5 A It's all blocked off. There's no entrance from that 
6 complex. 
7 Q Is there any way to get into it to crawl over the 
8 gates or? 
9 A If you're going to crawl over a six foot fence. 
10 Q Okay. Then you immediately asked him for his 
11 identification? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Okay. And then if you can recall at the preliminary 
14 hearing, I asked you if there's anything suspicious about him 
15 and do you remember me asking you about that? 
16 A Vaguely. 
17 Q Okay. And your response was that, well, he was in 
18 the area where the call came from. 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q And then I asked you was there anything else 
21 suspicious about him. And you replied no. Is that correct? 
22 A If that's what I said, that's what I said. 
23 Q Okay, so other than the fact that he's in the area 
24 and it's late at night, there's nothing more suspicious about 
25 him? 
12 
1 A Other than the fact that he was in the area, it's 
2 dark out there, it's a dead end areaf as I've mentioned. 
3 Q And you mentioned that he's walking? Correct? 
4 A Correct. 
5 Q He's not running? 
6 A No. 
7 Q And there's nothing in his hand with, such as a 
8 dangerous weapon -
9 A No. 
10 Q is he acting nervous? 
11 A I don't recall. It's been too long. 
12 Q There's nothing more about his behavior that makes 
13 you suspicious of some illegal activity? 
14 A Other than the fact he was in the area it's 3:00 in 
15 the morning, it's dark outside, and he's in the back of a 
16 complex where he does not live. 
17 MS. SISNEROS: Okay. Nothing further. 
18 THE COURT: Anything else? 
19 MS. ANDRUZZI: No. 
20 THE COURT: You can step down. Thank you. Do you 
21 want to submit it or do you want to argue or what do you want 
22 to do? 
23 MS. SISNEROS: Well, if I could just quickly. 
24 There's three levels in a stop. The first level you can stop 
25 and question the individual. The initial questioning is fine. 
13 
1 He's asking him what he's doing there. Once he takes his 
2 identification, he's now detained him and that has risen to a 
3 level two stop. There's no question about that. I don't think 
4 the State can -
5 THE COURT: Well, I think the State conceded that. 
6 MS. SISNEROS: Right. Okay. So the question is 
7 whether or not he was justified to raise it to a level two 
8 stop. In order to do so, an officer has to have articulable 
9 suspicion that this person has committed a crime or is about to 
10 commit a crime. That raises it to the level of reasonable 
11 suspicion. And as I've argued in my memorandum, even if you 
12 take everything that has been stated, the lateness of the hour, 
13 the area that he's in, there's just been a crime in the area, 
14 that is not enough for reasonable suspicion for a level two 
15 stop. 
16 There's definite case law that says specifically that 
17 in Humphrey, in Stewart, when you've got lateness of an hour, 
18 in an 3a where a crime has just been committed, those are 
19 cases t.iat specifically that say those two taken into 
20 consideration, that's not enough. There has to be something 
21 that tells this officer there is something more going on here. 
22 He's acting nervous. He has a gun in his hand. He's got a knife 
23 readily accessible. He's running away. There's a woman standing 
24 right next to him, something that leads us to believe, yeah, 
25 this might be the person who just was involved in this crime. 
14 
1 There's nothing here that tells us anything more than this man 
2 is out walking around late at night. Nothing. 
3 Can you stop and question him and ask him, what are 
4 you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? 
5 Yes, he can. He can - he can keep him there and continue to 
6 ask him further questions, but he doesn't do that. He 
7 immediately takes his identification and when he does that, he 
8 does it without reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime 
9 has been committed. Having done that and not having anything 
10 more specific about what it is that he thinks rises to the 
11 level of reasonable suspicion, this is an illegal stop and 
12 we're asking that you grant our motion and suppress the 
13 evidence that was found. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Andruzzi. 
15 MS. ANDRUZZI: Thank you, your Honor. 
16 In Munson and Humphrey, the court held that lateness 
17 of the hour alone does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. 
18 There may be valid reasons for somebody to be out. It's also 
19 true that in Stewart, it indicates that a person's privacy in 
20 an area where a crime has been committed is alone not enough. 
21 But what we look at is the totality of the circumstances. We 
22 have a person who's not headed anywhere that we can see would 
23 be towards a locked gate, where he's clearly not supposed to 
24 be, or over a six foot fence to the Jordan River. He's not 
25 headed in the direction where he indicates to the officer that 
15 
1 he lives. He's in a place where a call has just come in that 
2 someone is crying out for help, it's dark, he's the only person 
3 there, and it's 3:14 in the morning. So we have more that just 
4 one or two of these factors, we have all of these factors and 
5 we look at them all together. 
6 Clearly the minimal intrusion of a five minute stop 
7 to check for someone's identification, Ms. Sisneros is correct 
8 and perhaps it wouldn't rise to the level of a level three 
9 stop, but certainly the minimal intrusion that's imposed on a 
10 defendant by requesting his identification and waiting five 
11 minutes for him to run his warrants are clearly merited by the 
12 circumstances in this case. The officer had a duty to 
13 investigate those cries for help. He has a duty to find out if 
14 this person is involved in that. Merely taking the defendant's 
15 word for it that he's not involved in somebody crying out for 
16 help would not be enough. He must do more than that. What he 
17 did was reasonable under the circumstances. He ran to see if 
18 the defendant had any prior involvement of this kind. He ran 
19 the warrant's check. Came back with the defendant had a 
20 warrant. Under the circumstances, and looking at all the 
21 circumstances, it was clearly merited by the circumstances. 
22 Thank you. 
23 MS. ANDRUZZI: Just quickly. He does have the duty 
24 to stop and question him, what he doesn't have the duty to do 
25 and he doesn't have probable - a reasonable suspicion to do is 
16 
1 to stop and detain him. I draw your attention to State v. 
2 Truiillo, because we do have a case there, it's late at night. 
3 It's in a high crime area and we have a person walking with a 
4 knapsack in what the officer called a suspicious manner. You 
5 do have all of those situations there, and the court even in 
6 that case with all three of those factors said that's not 
7 enough. 
8 MS. SISNEROS: And, your Honor, if I could just -
9 THE COURT: Well, that's okay, because I've made up 
10 my mind. I think there's - there are a couple of added factors 
11 that played into what I believe was an appropriate stop by the 
12 officer, and that is headed down a dead end road where he can't 
13 go anywhere, can't get anywhere, is suspicious enough in my own 
14 mind. And then the fact that he said he was going home, and 
15 his home was nowhere in the area. So you not only have the 
16 three factors that you just mentioned, Ms. Sisneros, but those 
17 two additional factors that play heavy on me in terms of my 
18 belief that the officer was doing what he should have done 
19 appropriately. I believe he would have been remiss in not 
20 pursuing it further just because the whole circumstance didn't 
21 make any sense. He was there on a call and here's this guy 
22 that tells him he's going home? With no way to go home? 
23 MS. SISNEROS: Can I just address that? Because I -
24 THE COURT: No. Those are the facts that I find, and 
25 I believe it's sufficient and I'm going to deny the motion. 
17 
1 Ms. Andruzzi, you can prepare an appropriate order. 
2 MS. ANDRUZZI: Would the Court like findings on that, 
3 or just an order? 
4 THE COURT: I don't know. She'll probably appeal it, 
5 so I'd make findings. 
6 MS. ANDRUZZI: All right. 
7 THE COURT: So submit them to her for her approval as 
8 to form. 
9 Do we need to schedule this for trial or anything or 
10 what? 
11 MS. ANDRUZZI: We probably can schedule it for a 
12 scheduling conference. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Let's do that. Let's - let's 
14 do it on the 24"h of September at 8:30 for a scheduling 
15 conference. 
16 MS. ANDRUZZI: Thank you, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
19 
20 
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PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
STATE OF UTAH V. DAVID MARKLAND 
CASE NO. 
JUDGE: (J) 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT: (D) 
ATTORNEY FOR PROSECUTION: (P) 
WITNESS #1:(W) 
WITNESS #2: (W) 
CHARGE: - 3° 
DATE OF HEARING: 
We're here in the matter of State v. David Roger Markland. Set for Preliminary Hearing. 
Case number 011906683. Mr. Markland is present with his counsel, Ms. Sisneros. Ms. 
Cook representing the State. And we're ready to proceed then? 
We are. 
Very good. Do you waive formal reading of the information, Ms. Sisneros? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Let me just for my own information [inaudible] charges are here. Mr. Markland, you're 
charged with what appears to be two counts. And that's Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, at 4517 South Bridgeside Way, Salt Lake 
County, on or about April 30th, 2001. And it's alleged that you did knowingly and 
intentionally have in your possession a controlled substance, that being 
methamphetamine. And count II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class 
B misdemeanor, at the same place and date - the substance alleged to have been 
1 
1 marijuana. Are you ready to proceed, Ms. Cook? 
2 P: We are, Your Honor. 
3 J: Okay. 
4 P: The State calls Deputy Spotten. 
5 J: Come on up and be sworn, [witness is sworn] You may proceed. 
6 P: Thank you. Would you please state your name? 
7 W: Edward Spotten. 
8 P: And how do you spell your last name? 
9 W: S-P-O-T-T-E-N. 
10 P: What is your occupation? 
11 W: Deputy for Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office. 
12 P: How long have you been doing that? 
13 W: Two and a half years. Three years, about. 
14 P: And were you so employed on April 30th, year 2001? 
15 W: I was. 
16 P: And on that date did you have occasion to be in the area of 4517 South Bridgeside Way? 
17 W: I did. 
18 P: Is that in Salt Lake County? 
19 W: It'sinTaylorsville. 
20 P: Is Taylorsville in Salt Lake County? 
21 W: Yes. It is. 
22 P: Can you tell me why you were in that area? 
v i - * 
Yes. We received a call because there was somebody crying out or yelling to stop. 
Something to that effect. We didn't know what it was. Kind of suspicious circumstance 
call. 
Were you sent to investigate that crying out? 
Yes. 
And when you went to that area, did you observe anything or anyone that caught your 
attention? 
We saw a male walking away from the area where the call supposedly came in. 
Did you stop to talk with that man? 
I did. 
Do you see that male here in the courtroom today? 
I d a 
Can you please point to him and tell me what he's wearing? 
Yes. He's wearing the dark bluejacket. 
And did you later learn this male's name? 
Yes. 
What was that name? 
David Roger Markland. 
Your Honor, if the record could reflect he has identified the defendant. 
Witness has identified the defendant. 
Thank you. After you obtained Mr. Markland's name, did you do anything with that 
information? 
3 
I checked with our dispatch. Ran it for warrants. Verified his ID. Things like that. 
Did you discover anything? 
Yes, I did. 
What did you discover? 
He had a warrant for his arrest. 
And after learning that, what did you do? 
I placed him into custody and served the warrant on him. 
And after Mr. Markland was placed into custody, did you do anything with him then? 
Yes. I performed a search incident to arrest. 
Did you discover anything during that search? 
Yes, we did. We discovered some paraphernalia and some drugs. 
What did you have done with those controlled substances? 
We actually have field test kits that we carry with us. And we field tested the marijuana 
and we field tested the meth, both of which flashed positive for the substances. 
And do you know if those were later sent to the State crime lab? 
They were. 
Your Honor, if I could approach the witness. 
You may. 
I'm handing you what's previously been marked for identification as State's exhibit 
number 1. Do you recognize that? 
Yes. 
Can you tell me what that is? 
4 
1 W: This is the results from the crime lab analysis. 
2 P: And do those results relate to this case? 
3 W: They do. 
4 P: How do you know that? 
5 W: On the top of the page here, it has the case number. 01 dash 46288. 
6 P: And is that the same as the case number in front of you? 
7 W: It is. 
8 P: Does Mr. Markland's name appear in that report? 
9 W: I believe it does. Yes. Right there. 
10 P: Your Honor, the State moves for the admission of exhibit 1. 
11 J: Any objection, Ms. Sisneros? 
12 D: No, Your Honor. 
13 J: It will be received. 
14 P: Thank you. Deputy, if you would please read the results of the tox. I believe you'll find 
15 them at the bottom of the page. 
16 W: Controlled Substance Analysis. Item number 1. Methamphetamine was identified in the 
17 plastic bag. Total weight of the white crystal was 10 milligrams. Item number 3. The 
18 plastic bag was found to contain 110 milligrams of crushed marijuana. The hand-rolled 
19 cigarette was not analyzed. 
20 P: And Deputy, quickly. The tox report refers to methamphetamine found in a plastic bag. 
21 Do you recall specifically where on Mr. Markland's person the plastic bag with 
22 methamphetamine was located? 
UL 
1 W: Yes, I do. 
2 P: Where was that? 
3 W: There was a white plastic container in his suit jacket. And it was inside that container. 
4 P: And was this a suit jacket that he was actually wearing at the time? 
5 W: Yes. 
6 P: Do you recall where the baggie of marijuana was found? 
7 W: It was in a black bag that he was carrying with him. 
8 P: Thank you. I have nothing further at this time. 
9 J: Ms. Sisneros? 
10 D: You say that you received a call that someone was crying out? 
11 W: Uhhuh. 
12 D: Was this over dispatch? 
13 W: Yes, it was. There's a case number. If you'd like that, I can give it to you. 
14 D: How long would you say it took you to get to the point where you see Mr. Markland.; 
15 W: It was shortly after I arrived. I couldn't be exact. Just a few minutes. 
16 D: From the time that you received this call from dispatch to the time that you see Mr. 
17 Markland. About how much time? 
18 W: Maybe three or four minutes. 
19 D: So when you received the dispatch, where are you? 
20 W: I don't recall where I was. It's been a long time ago. I know it was fairly short though. 
21 D: Could you estimate maybe a mile? A block? 
22 W: I can't. I don't remember exactly where I was. I know that I responded to the call. 
m 
1 D: And when you arrived, did you hear anyone crying out? 
2 W: I did not. 
3 D: Did you stop and listen for a minute before you approached Mr. Markland? 
4 W: Did I stop and listen? I don't recall actually if I did stop and listen or not. I just responded 
5 to the area where responding to suspicious circumstance. I observed a male walking away 
6 from the area where there was someone crying out according to what dispatch had told us. 
7 D: So immediately when you arrive in the area, you see Mr. Markland. 
8 W: That's correct. 
9 D: Why is it that you stop and talk to him? 
10 W: He's in an area where there's no apartments. It's actually back just a little way east of the 
11 apartment complex. It's an area that's blocked off. There used to be an entranceway there 
12 from exits 4500 South and they've blocked that off so you have to come in through 
13 Sunstone Row. And it's dark, not a well-lit area. Which is where the crying out 
14 supposedly had come from. 
15 D: And what time of day is this? 
16 W: It's in the middle of the night. I can look through the report and give you the exact time if 
17 you like. 3:14 in the morning. 
18 D: And when you see Mr. Markland, what is he doing? 
19 W: He's walking. 
20 D: So is he walking through this blocked off area? Was he walking out of the... 
21 W: He's walking towards the area that's blocked off. 
22 D: When you see him, is he on the sidewalk still? 
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i W: It's an actual roadway. He's walking in the middle of the roadway. 
2 D: By roadway, what do you mean? 
3 W: It's like, well, it's like an entrance to a complex but it's actually like a paved road. If 
4 you're entering into a private property, a lane, maybe. Like part of a lane. Cars can travel 
5 on it. 
6 D: And he's headed into this blocked off area? 
7 W: He's headed towards the gate that's closed. Yes. 
8 D: And you said there's nothing located in that area? 
9 W: There is... I was there just recently. There's a basketball court there There's an entrance 
10 to the bike path, which was locked at the time. 
11 D: Do you see anyone else in the area? 
12 W: There's nobody else. 
13 D: Is there anything suspicious about defendant, about this defendant that would make you 
14 think that maybe he was involved? 
15 W: Just the fact that he was there in the area where the call had came from. 
16 D: Anything else? 
17 W: No. 
18 D: When you approach him, do you ask him for his identification or do you just... 
19 W: Yes. 
20 D: ... ask him for his name? 
21 W: I asked him for ID too. 
22 D: And do you take his identification and then go check for warrants? 
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1 W: Yes. I got his ID and checked it for warrants. 
2 D: Before you... well, tell me. When you first initially contact him, do you immediately ask 
3 him for his identification? 
4 W: I ask him at some point right when we first contacted him. Yes. 
5 D: Do you tell him at all about why you're stopping him? 
6 W: Yes, I did. I told him we were investigating a suspicious circumstance. 
7 D: And does he respond to you at all about that? 
8 W: I believe. It 's been a long time but I thought he said he was going home or something to 
9 that effect. 
10 D: Do you ask him if he ' s involved with someone who ' s been crying out or do you ask him 
11 why he's there? 
12 W: I don ' t recall. I just remember him telling me that he said he was going home. 
13 D: Do you recall any kind of a conversation about somebody having been crying out? 
14 W: I think I asked him if he heard anything. 
15 D: And do you recall what his answer was? 
[ 6 W: It 's been too long. I can' t remember. 
17 D: Now you take his identification and you run it for warrants at that point? 
18 W: Yes. 
19 D: Is Mr. Markland standing? Sitting? 
10 W: Standing. 
11 D: And how far away is he from where you are? 
>2 W: Five, ten feet. 
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1 D: When you run... 
2 W: There was a deputy with me at the time. 
3 D: There's another deputy? 
4 W: Yes. 
5 D: Does he arrive with you or does he arrive later? 
6 W: He was with me. 
7 D: So is he standing with Mr. Markland while you run the warrant check? 
8 W: I believe so. 
9 D: Now Mr. Markland is not handcuffed. 
10 W: No. Not at all. 
11 D: But the other officer is standing next to him. 
12 W: Correct. We watch each other. We look out for each other. That's correct. 
13 D: And then the warrant comes back at that point. And then do you arrest him immediately 
14 at that point? 
15 W: I advised him that he had a warrant and he was going to be under arrest. Yes. 
16 D: And you handcuffed him at that point? 
17 W: I did. 
18 D: And this bag that you search, is that a bag that he has in his hands or over his shoulder? 
19 W: He was carrying it on his person. How he was carrying it, I don't recall. But it was in his 
20 possession. Carrying it. 
21 D: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
22 J: Thank you. Any redirect? 
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1 P: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 
2 J: All right, Ms. Cook. Any further witnesses? 
3 P: The State rests. 
4 J: You may step down. Thank you. Anything further from counsel? 
5 D: No, Your Honor. I have advised my client that I believe he should not testify and I believe 
6 that he will be taking that advice. 
7 J: Mr. Markland, are you going to take your attorney's advice? 
8 Defendant: I am, Your Honor. 
9 J: All right. Thank you. Both sides rest, then? 
10 D: We'll submit it, Judge. 
11 J: OK. Thank you. Based on the testimony I've heard, I do find that there is probable cause 
12 to believe that both counts I and counts II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
13 Substance, third degree felony, possession of a substance being methamphetamine, and 
14 Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class B misdemeanor, the substance 
15 being marijuana did occur and that the defendant was the person that committed those 
16 offenses. Therefore, I'll bind the defendant over to answer in District Court on both 
17 offenses. 
